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probit modeling results suggest that conditional on adequate banking supervision, certain 
dimensions of financial reform reduce the likelihood of systemic crises. We also show that 
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more stable financial systems. We also find some evidence that the likelihood of non-systemic 
crisis increases after financial reform. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial reform can be defined as measures aiming at the removal of non-
competitive market forces in the financial sector, thereby increasing its level of 
liberalization. Consequently, financial reform improves financial sector 
development, which, in turn, may enhance economic growth. At the same time, 
there is some evidence that increasing liberalization induces risk-taking behavior 
and may cause banking crises (cf. Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Mehrez and 
Kaufmann, 2000). However, previous studies did not consider the conditioning 
impact of supervisory control or the overall level of financial liberalization in 
analyzing the impact of reform on the likelihood of crises. Moreover, the financial 
liberalization data used in these studies was quite limited and rather subjective. We 
employ a better methodology and an extensive new data set of financial reform 
recently provided by Abiad et al. (2008) to examine the impact of financial reform 
on banking crises. Our findings suggest that certain dimensions of financial reform 
reduce the likelihood of systemic banking crises—defined as crises in which much 
or all bank capital has been exhausted—conditional on adequate banking 
supervision. This result is broadly in line with the finding of Beck et al. (2006) that 
the presence of regulatory policies and institutions that discourage competition are 
associated with greater banking system fragility. We also find that once a country 
has reformed, the introduction of further reforms becomes easier and leads to more 
stable financial systems. This implies that there is a “learning effect” which has also 
been pointed out by Abiad and Mody (2005) in a different context. Moreover, we 
find some evidence that the likelihood of non-systemic crises—defined as crises 
limited to a small number of banks—increases after financial reform enhancing 
liberalization. These results therefore suggest that increased competition due to the 
financial reform may lead to the elimination of some inefficient financial 
institutions. 
We analyze the impact of financial reform on systemic and non-systemic 
banking crises in 85 countries during the period 1973 to 2002. Our data on banking 
crises come from Honahan and Laeven (2005). Our indicator of financial form is 
based on the data set of Abiad et al. (2008) indicating the extent to which a 
financial system is liberalized.
2 This is an extended and updated version of the 
                                                      
2 The dataset of Abiad et al. (2008) covers 91 countries and a longer period, but many other 
explanatory variables are not available for all countries, thereby restricting our sample.    3
database as used by Abiad and Mody (2005), covering various dimensions of the 
financial system. The measures relate to the presence of (i) credit controls and 
reserve requirements, (ii) interest rate controls, (iii) entry barriers, (iv) state 
ownership in the banking sector, (v) capital account restrictions, (vi) prudential 
regulation and supervision of the banking sector, and (vii) securities market policy. 
We address the following research questions: (1) does financial reform, 
conditional on supervisory control, affect the likelihood of a systemic banking 
crisis, and if so, are there differences among the various dimensions of financial 
reform that we distinguish? (2) Does the impact of financial reform on banking 
crises vary at different levels of liberalization of the financial system? and (3) Are 
systemic and non-systemic crises affected in the same way by financial reform 
leading to more liberalization?  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a 
discussion on the determinants of banking crises and a brief literature review. It also 
introduces our measures for financial reform and banking crises. Section 3 
describes the specification of our model and explains other explanatory variables 
used in our analysis. Section 4 analyses the impact of financial reform on the 
likelihood of systemic crises. Section 5 examines whether the impact of financial 
reform is conditioned by the level of liberalization.  Section 6 deals with the impact 
of financial liberalization on non-systemic crises. Finally, section 7 offers a 
discussion of our results and their policy implications.  
 
 
2. Financial reform and banking crisis 
2.1 Previous studies 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) analyze the relationship between banking 
crises and policies aimed at increasing financial liberalization using data over the 
period 1980-95 for 53 countries. Their findings suggest that banking crises are more 
likely to occur in liberalized financial systems. They also find that the impact of 
financial liberalization on a fragile banking sector is weaker where the institutional 
environment is strong. The indicator of financial reform used by Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1998) is a dummy variable taking a value of one for the first year 
in which some interest rates were liberalized. Although interest rate liberalization is   4
important, it only covers a minor part of financial sector reform. Furthermore, this 
indicator does account for policy reversals.  
Mehrez and Kaufmann (2000) examine how absence of corruption 
(‘transparency’) affects the probability of a financial crisis. Using multivariate 
probit modeling for 56 countries during 1977-97, they report a higher probability of 
a crisis following financial reform during the following five years. Moreover, they 
find that the crisis probability is higher in countries with poor transparency than in 
countries that are transparent. Mehrez and Kaufmann (2000) provide their own 
dating of financial reform and construct their reform measure on the basis of these 
dates.  
Focusing on the link between currency and banking crises, Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) analyze 76 currency crises and 26 banking crises for 20 countries 
during 1970 to mid-1995. One of their main findings is that financial reform 
enhancing liberalization often precedes banking crises. Their proxy for increased 
financial liberalization is two-year lagged domestic credit growth. Again, this is a 
poor proxy as increased credit growth may also be caused by various other factors 
than financial reform and it does not capture the diversity of financial reform.  
On the basis of a panel analysis, Caprio and Martinez (2000) find that 
government ownership of banks increases the likelihood of banking crisis. 
However, Barth et al. (2004) using cross-country analysis, do not find that 
government ownership is significantly associated with increases in bank fragility 
once they control for the regulatory and supervisory environment. 
There are also various papers that do not explicitly include policies aiming 
at financial liberalization as a potential determinant of banking crises. A good 
example is the recent study by Beck et al. (2006) who examine the impact of bank 
concentration, bank regulations, and national institutions on the likelihood that a 
country experiences a systemic banking crisis. They use data from 1980 to 1997 for 
69 countries and report that crises are less likely in economies with more 
concentrated banking systems. Moreover, they find that regulatory policies and 
institutions that discourage competition are associated with greater banking system 
fragility.    5
 
2.2 Data 
The studies discussed above use different indicators of banking crises. Our indicator 
of banking crises is based on the Honohan and Laeven (2005) dataset that updates 
the work by Caprio and Klingebiel (1999), distinguishing between systemic and 
non-systemic banking crises that have occurred since the late 1970s. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive database on banking crises.
3 In our 
analysis of the relationship between (systemic and non-systemic) banking crises and 
financial reform we use a sample of 85 countries during 1973 to 2002. This 
selection is primarily dictated by the availability of the financial liberalization 
index, to be discussed hereafter, and the availability of control variables. Table A1 
in the Appendix identifies the years in which the countries in our sample had a 
crisis.  
  Our data on financial liberalization come from Abiad et al. (2008) who 
distinguish seven dimensions of the extent to which the financial sector has been 
liberalized that are graded on scale from 3 (fully liberalized) to 0 (not liberalized). 
Apart from distinguishing between different dimensions of financial liberalization 
on an annual basis, the database has the advantage that it allows for policy 
reversals. The first dimension of liberalization refers to credit controls and 
excessively high reserve requirements (referred to as credit controls henceforth) 
focusing on the presence of specific credit ceilings or floors, and reserve 
requirements. The second dimension is about interest rate controls examining 
whether they are administered by the government, and whether there are floors, 
ceilings or bands present. The third dimension is entry barriers, which is based on 
licensing requirements and restrictions on geographical outreach activities. The 
fourth dimension covers state ownership in the banking sector, i.e., the share of the 
assets of the banking sector controlled by state-owned banks. The fifth dimension 
refers to capital account restrictions and other restrictions on international capital 
flows. The sixth dimension captures prudential regulations and supervision of the 
banking sector, including compliance with the Basel standards, and executive 
influence on the banking supervisory agency. The final dimension refers to 
                                                      
3 Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) define a systemic banking crisis as a crisis in which much or all bank 
capital been exhausted. Honohan and Laeven (2005) use the same definition. A non-system banking 
crisis is a crises limited to a small number of banks. We could not use the updated dataset provided   6
securities market policy covering the auctioning of government securities, debt and 
equity market development, and openness to foreign investors.  
  Abiad  et al. (2008) acknowledge that the dimension referring to the 
supervision and prudential regulation of banks is different from the other 
dimensions of financial liberalization. A higher score in this case means better (or 
more) regulation. So in our empirical analysis, we do not treat this as a dimension 
of financial liberalization. We also exclude it in calculating our overall 
liberalization measure, which consists of the sum of the scores of the various 
liberalization dimensions excluding supervision. 
Figure 1 shows the growth of the different financial liberalization measures 
and the financial supervision measure over the period of 1973-2005, differentiating 
between high-income OECD countries and other countries. As follows from Figure 
1, the average level of financial liberalization has increased over time, but the 
financial systems of high-income OECD countries are more liberalized than those 
of other countries in the sample and they are better supervised as well. Still, the gap 
between the two groups of countries has decreased over the 1973-2005 period for 
all liberalization dimensions, except for securities markets and capital controls. 
However, while financial systems in non-high-income OECD countries have been 
liberalized substantially, their supervisory control systems have evolved more 
slowly and the gap with high-income OECD countries has increased. As our results 
suggest that supervisory control should be complementary to financial reform 
enhancing liberalization, weaknesses in this respect may result in financial 
vulnerability. 
We take the change of the various liberalization measures as our indicators 
of financial reform. Table A2 in the appendix shows Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficients between the different indicators of financial reform. It follows that the 
various dimensions of financial reform clearly differ from one another.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
by Laeven and Valencia (2008) as it does not distinguish between systemic and non-systemic crises, 
while the duration of the crises is also not available.   7
 
Figure 1. Financial liberalization and supervision in high-income OECD and other countries 
 
This figure presents trends in (different types of) financial liberalization and bank supervision in 
high-income OECD and other countries over the period 1973-2005. The dashed lines represent 
financial liberalization and supervisory control for high-income OECD countries while the solid 
lines refer to other countries in our sample.  
 
 
3. Model specification 
 
To analyze the impact of financial liberalization on systemic and non-systemic 
banking crises, we estimate the following model: 
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The dependent variable  , it Crisis takes a value of 1 if there is a banking crisis and 
zero if there is no crisis. In section 4 the dependent variable refers to systemic crisis, 
while in section 6 the dependent variable refers to non-systemic crisis.
4 The 
                                                      
4 Following previous studies, we assume that banking crises do not lead to a new regime so that the 
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likelihood of a crisis in country i at time t is a function of the initial level of 
liberalization ( ,0 i Lib ); reform, taken here as the cumulative change in the level of 








∑Δ Lib ); the level of supervisory control ( , it Sup ); and a matrix of control 
variables ( , it Ctrl ). Following Mehrez and Kaufmann (2000), we examine the 
impact of reform measures taken over a five-years period on the likelihood of a 
banking crisis thereby minimizing potential problems of endogeneity. To check for 
the conditioning effect of banking supervision, we introduce an interaction term of 
financial reform with the level of supervision.  
  Models with interactive terms cannot be interpreted directly on the basis of 
the coefficients of the constituent or interaction terms and their significance (Aiken 
and West, 1991; Brambor et al., 2006; and Shehzad et al., 2010). Therefore, we 
follow the approach suggested by Aiken and West (1991) for non-linear models. If 
Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution and X i,t   denotes the explanatory 
variables in equation (1) then the conditional mean of the crisis variable can be 
written as:  
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right-hand side variables may be different than during normal times. We will address this issue later 
in the paper.     9







∑Δ Lib  and  (.) ηΦ refers 
to the marginal effect of the interaction term. The stated hypothesis tests the total 







∑Δ Lib  which may vary at different levels of supervisory 
control. 
To address our second research question, we interact financial reforms with 
the level of liberalization. The resulting model can identify whether the impact of 
financial reform on systemic crises varies at different levels of liberalization.  The 
corresponding model is: 
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If  Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution and  , it
Γ X  denotes all 
explanatory variables in equation (3), the conditional mean of the crisis variable can 
be written as: 
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The key hypothesis to test for the marginal effect of financial reform on the 
probability of a crisis, conditional on different levels of liberalization, can be 
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∑Δ Lib  which may vary at different levels of 
liberalization. 
We include various control variables following previous studies like 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Beck et al. (2006), and Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002). These variables include real GDP growth (one-year lagged), 
the rate of inflation
5 (change in CPI), the real interest, and the depreciation of the 
exchange rate. Finally, we include initial level of real GDP per capita (in US$) to 
control for the level of economic development, and the initial level of financial 
liberalization. Table 1 summarizes the control variables and Table A3 in the 
appendix gives a list of our dependent and independent variables
6 and also provides 
their sources and expected signs.  
  
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable Mean  Standard  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum  Observations 
Systemic crises  0.189 0.392  0  1  1459 
Non-systemic crises  0.070 0.255  0  1  1459 
Liberalization (overall)  11.742 6.062  0  21  1459 
Credit controls  1.826 1.058  0  3  1459 
Interest rate control  2.101 1.216  0  3  1459 
Banking entry  1.912 1.131  0  3  1459 
Privatization  1.411 1.191  0  3  1459 
Supervisory control  0.888 0.979  0  3  1459 
Capital controls  1.870 1.088  0  3  1459 
Securities markets  1.734 1.076  0  3  1459 
Real GDP growth  0.033 0.038  -0.14  0.17  1459 
Log (GDP/capita)  8219.502 9572.304  93.01  38200.41  1459 
Real interest rate  7.256 24.615  -97.81 789.80  1459 
Inflation  0.104 0.130  -0.11  0.99  1459 
Depreciation  -2.331 55.211  -1848.73  1.00  1459 
Economic freedom index  24.919 5.432  9.56  36.85  1347 
Openness  64.535 38.696  6.32  368.01  1436 
Bank concentration  0.671 0.206  0.20  1.00  827 
Corruption  3.636 1.436  0.00  6.00  1169 
Money and quasi-money/GDP  92.444 764.187  4.70  18798.83  1188 
Credit to private sector/GDP  0.518 0.428  0.01  3.45  1390 
 
 
                                                      
5 The inflation rate (p) is transformed by the formula (p/100)/(1+(p/100)) to reduce the influence of 
extreme observations. 
6 Data for certain variables, like bank concentration, corruption, money and quasi-money to GDP 
ratio, and credit to private sector, was not available for the whole period of analysis. Introducing 
these variables leads to a considerably smaller sample.    11
Table A4 in the Appendix shows the correlation matrix of the control 
variables, liberalization measures, and our indicators of banking crises. The table 
shows that the control variables are not highly correlated.  
 
4. Financial liberalization and systemic banking crisis 
 
4.1. Main results 
For the analysis of our first research question, i.e., what is the impact of financial 
liberalization on systemic banking crises conditional on supervisory control, we 
estimate equation (1) using a probit model with random effects.
7 Table 2 shows the 
results, while the outcomes for testing the hypotheses are shown in Figure 2.  
Instead of reporting marginal effects at means, we report average marginal 
effects as suggested by Bartus (2005) and Cameron and Trivedi (2009). According 
to these authors, marginal effects computed at means are not good approximations 
of average marginal effects. Sample means used for the calculation of marginal 
effects at means might refer to either non-existent or inherently nonsensical 
observations. Moreover, average marginal effects are more meaningful and easy to 
interpret.  
  In column (1), we regress systemic banking crises on control variables only, 
without using any financial reform measure or interactions. Our findings are in line 
with those of previous studies and the estimated coefficients are in accordance with 
the expected signs as shown in Table A2. Real GDP growth, initial GDP/capita, real 
interest rate, the initial level of liberalization, and depreciation turn out to be 
significant.  
  In column (2), we introduce our indicator of overall financial reform. It 
turns out that the interaction term of overall financial reform with supervision 
appears significant and has a negative sign. Economically, the effect is modest but 
still it clearly has a negative impact on the likelihood of systemic crises and in our 
later tests this effect remains quite robust.  
  In the remaining columns of Table 2 we include the various dimensions of 
financial reform separately one by one. We observe that the interaction terms of 
                                                      
7 We cannot use conditional logit or fixed effect models, because initial GDP per capita and initial 
level of liberalization are time-invariant variables. Furthermore, these techniques drop those 
countries that did not face any crisis during the sample period. Arellano and Hahn (2007) and Green 
(2004) show that the probit estimator is also not well behaved in the presence of fixed effects.    12
supervision and reforms come up significant except for barriers to entry and 
securities market reforms. Moreover, all these interaction effects have negative 
signs.  
However, as mentioned before, inference based on the coefficient of 
financial reform or the interaction term only is insufficient and can lead to deceptive 
findings.
8 So we provide the marginal effects of financial reforms and their 
confidence intervals (at 5 percent level of significance) in Figure 2. For a marginal 
effect of reform to be significantly positive (or negative), the marginal effect as well 
as the upper and lower bound should be in a positive (or negative) quadrant. As the 
figures show, when supervisory control improves, the effect of financial reform 
further reduces the likelihood of systemic crises and this effect is significant 
especially at higher levels of supervisory control. However, this conclusion does not 
hold for reforms improving bank entry and securities market reforms, which appear 
insignificant. 
  Consequently, our results suggest that most dimensions of financial reform 
reduce the likelihood of systemic crises, conditional on adequate banking 
supervision. The Wald chi-square tests and Likelihood ratio tests indicate joint 
significance of our models at the 1% level of significance.  
  How well do our models correctly predict crises? To examine this issue, we 
use Brier Scores.














Where  , it Crisis  is the actual dummy which takes a value of 1 if there is a crisis and 
0 if there is no crisis in country i at time t and  , Pr( )it Crisis is the estimated 
probability of a crisis in country i at time t. A perfect forecast will result in a Brier 
score of 0. A forecast that is always wrong will yield a Brier Score of 1, while a 
forecast that is correct in 50 percent will result in a Brier Score of 0.25. The Brier 
Score of our models is around 0.14, which indicates that our model is performing 
well.   
 
 
                                                      
8 A similar logic applies to supervisory control and its interaction terms.   13
4.2. Endogeneity  
Even though we follow Mehrez and Kaufmann (2000) and examine the impact of 
reform measures taken over period prior to a crisis, the results presented in section 
4.1 may suffer from an endogeneity problem, because supervisors may liberalize or 
reverse the liberalization of their financial systems in the wake of a crisis. We test 
for this problem using a two-step probit model with endogenous regressors.
10 Our 
main objective is to control for reverse causality. In order to keep the model simple, 
we drop the interaction terms. The results of the exercise do not suggest that our 
findings are caused by reverse causality. 
We use two instrument variables. The first one is from the economic 
freedom index dataset from the Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2008). The 
economic freedom index data is available from 1970 onwards and has several 
dimensions of economic freedom like size of government (expenditure, taxes and 
enterprises), legal structure and security of property rights, access to sound money, 
freedom to trade internationally and regulation of credit, labor, and business. We 
drop those dimensions of the economic freedom index that are very similar to our 
financial liberalization measures. The basic intuition for using this proxy is that 
financial sector reforms are often part of a broader economic reform program. 
Secondly, we use the openness of the economy (computed as the sum of exports 
and imports as a percentage of GDP) as an instrument. We average both 
instruments over five years. 
We check the validity of our instruments by the Amemiya-Lee-Newey 
minimum chi-square test under the null hypothesis that the used group of 
instruments is valid, i.e., they are uncorrelated with the error term in the structural 
equation. As shown in the bottom panel of Table A5 in the appendix, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis indicating that our set of instrument is valid. Next, we 
apply the Wald test of exogeneity under the null hypothesis that the instrumented 
variable is exogenous. The results as shown in Table A5 suggest that none of the 
reform measures appears endogenous. 
An alternative check on endogeneity was performed, dropping all the 
observations after the start of a crisis (keeping the first year only) until the end of 
the crisis and re-estimating the models shown in Table 2. This hardly affects our 
                                                                                                                                                    
9 See Schmidt and Griffith (1998) for a detailed discussion on Brier Scores.    14
main conclusions (results available on request). This approach, following Barrell et 
al. (2009), also deals with a possible objection that the impact of our control 
variables on the likelihood of a crisis will be different during a crisis. 
                                                                                                                                                    
10 We implement the two-step probit model with endogenous regressors and use robust standard 
errors for the clustering over countries. Table 2. Effect of financial reform on systemic crises  
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Real GDP growth (t-1)  Coefficient  -1.092*** -1.136*** -1.235*** -1.158*** -1.232*** -1.103*** -1.192*** -1.227*** 
   S.E.  0.221  0.25 0.256 0.251 0.256 0.249 0.253 0.257 
Log (initial GDP/capita)  Coefficient  -0.056*** -0.061*** -0.059*** -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.064*** -0.058*** -0.058*** 
   S.E.  0.02 0.021  0.02 0.021  0.02 0.021  0.02  0.02 
Real interest rate  Coefficient  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
   S.E.  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Inflation  Coefficient  0.032 0.064 0.081 0.097 0.076 0.027 0.062 0.079 
   S.E.  0.107  0.111 0.11 0.11 0.11  0.111 0.11 0.11 
Depreciation  Coefficient  0.179**  0.142* 0.156** 0.152** 0.166** 0.160** 0.153** 0.163**   
   S.E.  0.075 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.075 0.076 
Initial liberalization  Coefficient  -0.019** -0.021** -0.021** -0.019** -0.020** -0.020** -0.021** -0.020**   
   S.E.  0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Supervisory Control (SC)  Coefficient  0.009  0.039** 0.025*  0.016  0.009 0.026* 0.024*  0.013 
   S.E.  0.013 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 
Financial reform (overall) (LR)   Coefficient     -0.004                    
   S.E.     0.005                    
SC*LR  Coefficient     -0.017***                    
   S.E.     0.006                    
Credit controls reform (CR)  Coefficient        0.013                 
   S.E.        0.014                 
SC*CR  Coefficient        -0.032**                 
   S.E.        0.016                 
Interest rate control reform (IR)  Coefficient           -0.019              
   S.E.           0.012              
SC*IR  Coefficient           -0.044**              
   S.E.           0.019              
Banking entry reform (BR)  Coefficient              -0.011           
   S.E.              0.016           
SC*BR  Coefficient              0.019           
   S.E.              0.017           
Privatization reform (PR)  Coefficient                 -0.03          16 
   S.E.                 0.02        
SC*PR   Coefficient                 -0.044**        
   S.E.                 0.019        
Capital controls reform (CapR)  Coefficient                    -0.01     
   S.E.                    0.015     
SC*CapR  Coefficient                    -0.038**     
   S.E.                    0.017     
Securities markets reforms (SR)  Coefficient                       -0.004 
   S.E.                       0.021 
SC*SR  Coefficient                       0.005 
   S.E.                       0.021 
                             
No. of Observations     1559 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 
No. of Countries     85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 
Wald Chi-squared     72.735*** 87.484*** 75.001*** 86.585*** 72.434*** 90.322*** 82.027*** 72.130*** 
L Ratio Test     198.398*** 202.367*** 201.493*** 200.785*** 199.773*** 211.488*** 202.104*** 195.743*** 
Brier Score     0.142  0.14 0.142 0.141 0.142 0.141  0.14 0.142 
Reported coefficients and corresponding standard errors (S.E.) are average marginal effects and have been calculated following the approach suggested by Bartus (2005). 
*** indicates significance at 1 percent level of significance, ** indicates significance at 5 percent level and * indicates significance at 10 percent level of significance.     17 
 
Figure 2. Effect of financial reform on systemic banking crises at different levels of supervisory control 
 
This figure shows the marginal effect of different kinds of financial reform on the likelihood of systemic banking crises at different levels of supervisory control. It corresponds to our results in 
Table 2. The middle line shows the marginal effect of a particular dimension of reform, while the upper and lower lines indicate the upper and lower 95 percent confidence intervals. LR refers to 
overall reform, CR refers to credit control reform, IR refers to interest rate control reform, BR refers to banking entry reform, PR refers to privatization reform, while CapR refers to capital control 
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Table 3. Effect of financial reform on systemic crises conditional on the level of liberalization 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Real GDP growth  Coefficient  -1.034*** -1.057*** -1.141*** -1.110*** -1.161*** -1.065*** -1.108*** -1.175*** 
   S.E.  0.215 0.243 0.248 0.246 0.249 0.244 0.245 0.251 
Initial GDP/capita  Coefficient  -0.076*** -0.082*** -0.074*** -0.079*** -0.075*** -0.083*** -0.077*** -0.075*** 
   S.E.  0.019  0.02 0.019 0.019 0.019  0.02 0.019 0.019 
Real interest rate  Coefficient  0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
   S.E.  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Inflation  Coefficient  0.038  0.129 0.09 0.13  0.078  0.076  0.086  0.079 
   S.E.  0.104 0.109 0.107 0.109 0.107 0.109 0.106 0.107 
Depreciation  Coefficient  0.177** 0.127* 0.142* 0.128*  0.157**  0.154**  0.147**  0.156**   
   S.E.  0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 
Supervisory control  Coefficient  0.007  -0.007 0.019  -0.003 0.024 0.017 0.012 0.023 
   S.E.  0.016 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
Level of liberalization  Coefficient  0  0.007*  -0.001  0.003  -0.004 0 0  -0.003 
   S.E.  0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Financial reform (overall) (LR)   Coefficient     0.015                    
   S.E.     0.011                    
Liberalization*LR  Coefficient     -0.003***                    
   S.E.     0.001                    
Credit controls reform (CR)  Coefficient        0.066**                 
   S.E.        0.03                 
Liberalization*CR  Coefficient        -0.007**                 
   S.E.        0.003                 
Interest rate control reform (IR)  Coefficient           0.060*              
   S.E.           0.033              
Liberalization*IR  Coefficient           -0.010***              
   S.E.           0.003              
Banking entry reform (BR)  Coefficient              0.005           
   S.E.              0.033           
Liberalization*BR  Coefficient              0             19 
   S.E.              0.003           
Privatization reform (PR)  Coefficient                 0.02        
   S.E.                 0.049        
Liberalization*PR  Coefficient                 -0.007*        
   S.E.                 0.004        
Capital controls reform (CapR)  Coefficient                    0.017     
   S.E.                    0.031     
Liberalization*CapR  Coefficient                    -0.005*     
   S.E.                    0.003     
Securities markets reform (SR)  Coefficient                       0.041 
   S.E.                       0.047 
Liberalization*SR  Coefficient                       -0.003 
   S.E.                       0.004 
                             
No. of Observations     1559 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 
No. of Countries     85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 
Wald Chi-squared     70.791*** 87.377*** 75.847*** 86.913*** 71.521*** 88.965*** 79.968*** 72.031*** 
L Ratio Test     200.958*** 209.143*** 204.744*** 203.713*** 203.106*** 212.532*** 204.985*** 202.360*** 
Brier Score     0.144 0.141 0.144 0.142 0.145 0.142 0.143 0.144 
Reported coefficients and corresponding standard errors (S.E.) are average marginal effects and have been calculated as suggested by Bartus (2005). 
*** indicates significance at 1 percent level of significance, ** indicates significance at 5 percent level and * indicates significance at 10 percent level of significance.   
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Figure 3. Effect of financial reform on systemic banking crises at different levels of liberalization 
 
The figure shows the marginal effect of different kinds of financial reform on the likelihood of systemic banking crises at different levels of liberalization. It corresponds to our results in Table 3. 
The middle line shows the marginal effect of a particular dimension of reform, while the upper and lower lines indicate the upper and lower 95 percent confidence intervals. LR refers to overall 
reform, CR refers to credit control reform, IR refers to interest rate control reform, BR refers to banking entry reform, PR refers to privatization reform, CapR refers to capital control reform, and 
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Table 4. Effect of financial reform on non-systemic crises  
      (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
Real GDP growth (t-1)  Coefficient  -0.027 -0.029 -0.026  -0.028 -0.027  -0.036 -0.025  -0.036 
   S.E.  0.035  0.038 0.04  0.041 0.04  0.044  0.033  0.039 
Log (initial GDP/capita)  Coefficient  0 0 0  0.001 0  0.001 0  0.001 
   S.E.  0.003 0.003 0.003  0.003 0.003  0.003 0.003  0.003 
Real interest rate  Coefficient  0 0 0  0 0  0 0  0 
   S.E.  0 0 0  0 0  0 0  0 
Inflation  Coefficient  -0.008 -0.013 -0.004  -0.007 -0.015  -0.005 -0.005  -0.005 
   S.E.  0.017 0.021 0.019  0.02 0.022  0.019 0.016  0.017 
Depreciation  Coefficient  0.002 0.005 0.003  0.002 0.003  0.002 0.001  0.002 
   S.E.  0.007  0.011 0.01  0.008 0.01  0.006  0.006  0.007 
Initial liberalization  Coefficient  0.001 0.002 0.002  0.001 0.002  0.001 0.001  0.001 
   S.E.  0.001 0.002 0.002  0.001 0.002  0.001 0.001  0.001 
Supervisory Control (SC)  Coefficient  0.001  -0.002  0.001 0.001  0 0.001  -0.002  0 
   S.E.  0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002  0.002 
Financial reform (overall) (LR)   Coefficient     0.001                    
   S.E.     0.001                    
SC*LR  Coefficient     0.001                    
   S.E.     0.001                    
Credit controls reform (CR)  Coefficient        0.009                 
   S.E.        0.006                 
SC*CR  Coefficient        -0.001                 
   S.E.        0.002                 
Interest rate control reform (IR)  Coefficient           0.001              
   S.E.           0.002              
SC*IR  Coefficient           0.004              
   S.E.           0.003              
Banking entry reform (BR)  Coefficient              0.014           
   S.E.              0.009           
SC*BR  Coefficient              -0.001             22 
   S.E.              0.002           
Privatization reform (PR)  Coefficient                 0.002        
   S.E.                 0.003        
SC*PR   Coefficient                 -0.001        
   S.E.                 0.002        
Capital controls reform (CapR)  Coefficient                    -0.002     
   S.E.                    0.002     
SC*CapR  Coefficient                    0.007     
   S.E.                    0.004     
Securities markets reform (SR)  Coefficient                       0.002 
   S.E.                       0.003 
SC*SR  Coefficient                       0.006 
   S.E.                       0.004 
                             
No. of Observations     1559 1459 1459  1459 1459  1459 1459  1459 
No. of Countries     85 85 85  85 85  85 85  85 
Wald Chi-squared     4.807 41.847*** 29.712***  13.269 39.391*** 4.228 29.118***  18.570**   
L Ratio Test     175.541 170.146*** 168.891***  162.566 168.747***  156.234 169.283***  164.874**   
Brier Score     0.067 0.069 0.069  0.069 0.068  0.069  0.07  0.069 
Reported coefficients and corresponding standard errors (S.E.) are average marginal effects and have been calculated as suggested by Bartus (2005). 
*** indicates significance at 1 percent level of significance, ** indicates significance at 5 percent level and * indicates significance at 10 percent level of significance.    
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Figure 4. Effect of financial reform on non-systemic banking crises at different levels of supervisory control 
 
This figure shows the marginal effect of different kinds of financial reform on the likelihood of non-systemic banking crises at different levels of supervisory control. It corresponds to our results 
in Table 4. The middle line shows the marginal effect of a particular dimension of reform, while the upper and lower lines indicate the upper and lower 95 percent confidence intervals. LR refers 
to overall reform, CR refers to credit control reform, IR refers to interest rate control reform, BR refers to banking entry reform, PR refers to privatization reform, while CapR refers to capital 












































































































































We examine the robustness of our results presented in section 4.1 in a number of 
ways. These tests indicate that our results are not sensitive to changes in our sample 
and model specification. 
Firstly, we restrict our sample to non-OECD countries. It reduces our 
number of observations from 1459 country-year observations for 85 countries to 
944 country-year observations for 61 countries. The results are presented in Table 
A6 in the Appendix, while the corresponding tests of the hypotheses are shown in 
Figure A1 in the Appendix. The interaction effect of liberalization remains 
significant and negative, while the tests of the hypotheses are similar to those 
reported in Figure 2. The only change is that the interaction of privatization and 
supervisory control does not appear significant, but the corresponding hypothesis 
test does not change.  
Secondly, we change the list of control variables by adding corruption as 
suggested by Mehrez and Kaufmann (2000), banking concentration as suggested by 
Beck  et al. (2006), and two-year lagged credit to the private sector following 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Moreover, we add the ratio of money and quasi-
money to GDP as a control variable, following a number of studies (e.g., Beck et 
al., 2006). In the specification where we introduce our corruption variable the 
period of analysis is restricted from 1984 to 2002. Corruption only appears 
significant at 10 percent level of significance in two models and our main results 
remain unaffected. When we introduce bank concentration as a control variable, the 
sample is reduced to 80 countries with 827 observations (against 1459 in main 
results). Bank concentration does not appear significant and our results hold except 
for credit controls reform, which becomes non-significant. When we introduce 
money and quasi-money, the sample of analysis is reduced to 1188 observations 
from 73 countries, but it does not affect our main results. The additional control 
variable appears insignificant. The introduction of two-year lagged credit to the 
private sector reduces the sample to 1370 observations from 80 countries and does 
not affect any of our results although the private sector credit variable appears 
significant. All results are available on request. 
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5. The role of the level of financial liberalization  
In this section, we argue that financial reform does not only have a direct impact on 
the likelihood of a crisis, but also an indirect impact. Initial reforms help various 
players in the financial institutions to learn about the process of liberalization and it 
makes the outcome of an adverse effect less likely in the aftermath of further 
reforms. Abiad and Mody (2005) labeled this as “Learning Effect”, albeit in a 
different context.   
  The main estimation results of equation (3) are presented in Table 3 and the 
graphical presentation of the testing of the hypotheses is shown in Figure 3. As 
shown in Table 3, the interaction effects of the level of liberalization with financial 
reforms appear significant with a negative sign. The overall models appear 
significant at 1 percent level of significance and the Brier Scores also indicate that 
the models are performing well.  
  The top-left graph in Figure 3 presents the impact of reform at different 
levels of liberalization. A first thing to note is that the effect of reforms on the 
likelihood of a crisis appears negative after a certain minimum level of 
liberalization has been reached. As financial systems become more liberalized, the 
negative impact on the likelihood of systemic crises of further financial reforms 
becomes significant. This suggests that financial systems learn from the process of 
liberalization and leads to less fragility in the long run.  
  The same result holds for various dimensions of reform.  Removal of credit 
controls, interest rate controls, privatization, and capital account reform all 
contribute to a more stable banking sector.  
 
6. Are non-systemic crises different?  
With the introduction of more competition and transparency in the financial system 
through market-based reforms, it is very much likely that some inefficient banks are 
forced to close. Therefore, it seems likely that financial reform will have a different 
impact on non-systemic crises than on systemic crises. So far, most previous studies 
do not treat systemic and non-systemic crises differently. We are not aware of 
studies examining the impact of financial reform on non-systemic crises, even 
though the effect of financial reform on non-systemic crises is likely to differ from 
that on systemic crises. Modeling non-systemic crises is a difficult task for two   26
reasons. First, there are many factors that can cause non-systemic crises depending 
on the heterogeneous specializations and ownership structures of banks
11, and 
second, it is not necessary that these crises occur because of changes in 
macroeconomic or financial system variables. Still, we check whether financial 
reform affects the likelihood of non-systemic crises, thereby addressing our third 
research question. We estimate equation (1) using a panel probit model with non-
systemic crises as the dependent variable. 
  The results are shown in Table 4 and the corresponding hypothesis testing 
outcomes are presented in Figure 4. The models appear significant as indicated by 
Wald Chi-squared test and the Likelihood Ratio tests, except for the models shown 
in columns (1), (4), and (6). The macroeconomic variables that were significant in 
the model for systemic crises do not appear significant. Interestingly, the marginal 
effect of financial reform appears positive for non-systemic crises, although it is not 
significant. It points to important conclusions. First, systemic and non-systemic 
crises are driven by different factors and should be modeled accordingly. Second, 
the impact of financial reform on non-systemic crisis is very different from the 
impact of reform on systemic crises. If anything, financial reform increases the 
likelihood of non-systemic crises.  
 
 
7. Conclusions and policy implications  
We have examined the effect of (six dimensions of) financial reform on the 
likelihood of systemic and non-systemic banking crises. We find that reform that 
enhances liberalization reduces the likelihood of systemic crises, subject to 
appropriate supervisory control. Furthermore, financial systems learn from reform, 
which helps introducing further reforms without adverse outcomes. Moreover, we 
find that systemic and non-systemic crises are driven by different factors.  
  Our findings suggest the need to reconsider a widely shared view that has 
emerged in the wake of the current financial crisis, namely that strict regulation is 
needed for financial stability. Our results indicate that financial reform conditional 
on good supervisory control reduces the likelihood of systemic crises, and it 
therefore important to combine both policies in a meaningful way. In contrast, 
                                                      
11 For example, Shehzad et al. (2010) show how ownership structures of banking firms affect their 
risk taking behavior.   27
nowadays many observers seem to believe that reforms that have liberalized 
financial systems have played an important role in creating the current financial 
crises. Consequently, there may be a reversal of some of these liberalization 
measures in the wake of the crisis. However, as pointed out by Allen and Gale 
(2007), the extensive financial regulation introduced after the Great Depression not 
only led to the virtual disappearance of crises, it also seriously affected the 
efficiency of the financial system. Allen and Gale (2007) argue that the complete 
elimination of crises is neither optimal nor desirable, because it reduces the ability 
of financial institutions to perform their basic task of efficient allocation of 
resources. Excessive regulation reduces the incentives for banks to introduce new 
services and products. In view of the dynamic requirements of economies, the 
inability to introduce new products can result in sub-optimal risk hedging and 
exploitation of consumers. There is a possibility that history may repeat itself. Our 
results suggest that banking supervision needs to be improved but that the process 
of financial liberalization should not be reversed.  
  A potential danger highlighted by our results is the inadequate supervisory 
control in non-OECD economies. Financial reform in non-OECD countries has 
narrowed the liberalization gap with high-income OECD countries, but as far as 
supervision is concerned this gap has widened.  
  Our results also suggest that financial systems learn from reform, helping to 
create more stable banking systems. A reversal of liberalization will therefore also 
indirectly lead to more banking instability.  
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Table A1.  Systemic and non-systemic banking crises in our sample 
Country:  Systemic crises:  Non-systemic crises: 
Albania 1992-96     
Algeria 1990-92     
Argentina  1980-82, 1989-90,1995, 2001-02    
Australia     1989-92 
Austria       
Azerbaijan 1995-96     
Bangladesh 1988-96     
Belarus     1995-02 
Belgium       
Bolivia  1986-88, 1994-02    
Brazil  1990, 1994-99    
Britain     1974-76, 1980-89 
Bulgaria 1996-97     
Burkina-Faso 1988-94     
Cameroon  1987-93, 1995-98    
Canada     1983-85 
Chile  1976, 1981-83    
China 1990-02     
Colombia 1982-87     
Costa Rica  1994-96    
Cote d’Ivoire  1988-91    
Czech Republic  1989-91,    
Denmark     1987-92 
Dominican Rep      
Ecuador  1980-84, 1996-01    
Egypt 1980-84  1991-95 
El Salvador  1989    
Estonia 1992-95  1998 
Ethiopia     1994-95 
Finland 1991-94     
France     1994-95 
Georgia 1991-96     
Germany     1976-79 
Ghana 1982-89  1997-02 
Greece     1991-95 
Guatemala     1990-02 
Hong Kong     1982-86, 1988 
Hungary 1991-95     
India     1993-02 
Indonesia 1997-02  1994 
Ireland       
Israel 1977-83     
Italy     1990-95 
Jamaica 1996-00  1994 
Japan 1992-02     
Jordan     1989-90 
Kazakhstan       
Kenya 1985-89,  1992-95  1996-02 
Korea 1997-02     
Kyrgyz Rep  1990-02    
Latvia 1995-96     
Lithuania 1995-96       32
Madagascar 1988     
Malaysia 1997-01  1985-88 
Mexico  1981-91, 1994-00    
Morocco 1980-84     
Mozambique 1987-95     
Nepal 1988     
Netherlands       
New Zealand     1987-90 
Nicaragua 1986-02     
Nigeria 1991-95  1997 
Norway 1990-93     
Pakistan       
Paraguay 1995-00  2001-02 
Peru 1983-90     
Philippines  1983-87, 1998-02    
Poland 1992-95     
Portugal       
Romania 1990-96     
Russia  1995, 1998-99    
Senegal 1988-91     
Singapore     1982 
South Africa       
Spain 1977-85     
Sri Lanka  1989-93    
Sweden 1991-94     
Switzerland       
Taiwan 1997-98  1983-84,  1995 
Tanzania       
Thailand  1983-87, 1997-02    
Tunisia     1991-95 
Turkey 1982-85,  2000-02  1994 
Uganda 1994-96     
Ukraine 1997-98     
United States     1988-91 
Uruguay  1981-84, 2002    
Uzbekistan       
Venezuela 1994-95  1976-89 
Vietnam 1997-02     
Zimbabwe 1995-96     
 





Table A2. Spearman's rank correlation coefficients of different dimension of financial reform 
   1  2 3 4 5  6 7  8 
Δ Liberalization (1)  1.00                      
Δ Credit Controls (2)  0.39  1.00                   
Δ Interest Rate Control (3)  0.44  0.12  1.00                
Δ Banking Entry (4)  0.38  0.02  0.03  1.00             
Δ Privatization (5)  0.36  0.00  0.07  0.08  1.00          
Δ Supervisory Control (6)  0.36  0.03 -0.03 0.10 -0.01  1.00         
Δ Capital Controls (7)  0.47  0.05 0.13 0.08 0.05  0.00 1.00     
Δ Securities Markets (8)  0.35  0.09 0.06 0.01 0.02  -0.03 0.10  1.00 
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Table A3. Variable description and sources 
Dependent Variables 
Variable:  Source: 
Systemic crises  Honahan and Laeven (2005) 
Non-systemic crises  Honahan and Laeven (2005) 
Explanatory Variables 
Variable:  Expected sign:  Source: 
Liberalization (overall)  +/- Abiad  et al. (2008) 
Credit controls  +/- Abiad  et al. (2008) 
Interest rate control  +/- Abiad  et al. (2008) 
Banking entry  +/- Abiad  et al. (2008) 
Privatization  +/- Abiad  et al. (2008) 
Supervisory control  - Abiad  et al. (2008) 
Capital controls  +/- Abiad  et al. (2008) 
Securities markets  +/- Abiad  et al. (2008) 
Real GDP growth  -  World Development Indicators 
GDP/Capita  -  World Development Indicators 
Real interest rate  +  World Development Indicators 
Inflation  +  World Development Indicators 
Depreciation  +  World Development Indicators 
Economic Freedom index  +/-  Gwartney and Lawson (2008) 
Openness  +/-  World Development Indicators 
Bank concentration  - Beck  et al. (2000) 
Corruption  + ICRG 
Money and quasi-money/GDP  +/-  World Development Indicators 
Credit to private sector/GDP  +/-  World Development Indicators   35 
 
Table A4. Correlation matrix 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19  20  21 
Systemic crises (1)  1                                                             
Non-systemic crises (2)  -0.13  1                                                          
Liberalization (overall) (3)  -0.15  0.06  1                                                       
Credit controls (4)  -0.07  0.09  0.79  1                                                    
Interest rate control (5)  -0.08  0.07  0.82  0.63  1                                                 
Banking entry (6)  -0.04  -0.01  0.75  0.54  0.57  1                                              
Privatization (7)  -0.18  -0.01  0.7  0.45  0.47  0.42  1                                           
Supervisory control (8)  -0.13  0.03  0.78  0.58  0.52  0.55  0.45  1                                        
Capital controls (9  -0.15  0.08  0.83  0.56  0.65  0.5  0.51  0.59  1                                     
Securities markets (10)  -0.17  0.1  0.83  0.6  0.59  0.55  0.49  0.63  0.71  1                                  
Real GDP growth (11)  -0.12  -0.02  0.01  0.07  -0.01  -0.05  0.02  0  0  0  1                               
GDP/capita (12)  -0.2  0.01  0.57  0.41  0.36  0.28  0.39  0.5  0.53  0.65  -0.08  1                            
Real interest rate (13)  0.07  -0.02  0.06  0.06  0.11  0.06  0.03  0.03  0.05  0.01  -0.06  -0.04  1                         
Inflation (14)  0.14  0  -0.36  -0.36  -0.21  -0.19  -0.27  -0.33  -0.32  -0.33  -0.23  -0.3  -0.07  1                      
Depreciation (15)  0.02  0.01  -0.02  -0.01  0  -0.01  -0.02  -0.03  -0.02  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02  0  0.02  1                   
Economic Freedom index (16)  -0.21 0.07 0.69 0.58 0.44 0.35 0.49 0.55 0.67 0.68 0.05 0.68 0.13  -0.55  -0.01  1                     
Openness (17)  -0.05  -0.07 0.32 0.22 0.19  0.3 0.31 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.08 0.13  -0.02  -0.07 0.02  0.3  1                 
Bank concentration (18)  -0.05  -0.12  -0.14  -0.06  -0.18  -0.05 -0.1  -0.08  -0.12  -0.13 0.06  0  -0.11 0.08 0.01  -0.03 0.11  1             
Corruption (19)  -0.22 0.03 0.44 0.32 0.31 0.23 0.31 0.36 0.39 0.46  -0.05 0.67 0.01  -0.21  0 0.53 0.14 0.21  1         
Money & Quasi-money/GDP (20)  -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09  0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01  0 -0.01  0 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 0.03  1    
Credit to private sector/GDP (21)  -0.08  -0.05 0.52 0.38 0.32 0.27 0.44 0.42 0.49 0.56  -0.03 0.74  -0.03  -0.35  0 0.68 0.25  -0.09  0.51  0.01  1 
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Table A5. Effect of financial reform on systemic crises - Instrumental Probit results 
     (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Real GDP growth (t-1)  Coefficient  -5.148*** -4.988**  -3.172  -5.115*  -5.290*** -4.814**  -3.832 
   S.E.  1.982 2.361  6.578 2.699 1.969 2.076 3.247 
Log (Initial GDP/capita)  Coefficient  -0.301*** -0.212  -0.238 -0.214  -0.324***  -0.286***  -0.262**   
   S.E.  0.101 0.178  0.332 0.207 0.096  0.1 0.126 
Real interest rate  Coefficient  0.006 0.008  0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 
   S.E.  0.006 0.006  0.005 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 
Inflation  Coefficient  -0.115 -0.219  0.502 -0.645 -0.341 -0.304 -0.348 
   S.E.  0.906 0.867  0.889 0.959 0.859 0.913 0.941 
Depreciation  Coefficient  0.509 0.619  0.435 0.661 0.714 0.685  0.71 
   S.E.  0.461 0.524  0.739 0.528  0.47 0.475 0.483 
Initial level of liberalization  Coefficient  -0.033  -0.051*  -0.002 -0.055 -0.027 -0.031 -0.032 
   S.E.  0.034 0.029  0.042 0.038 0.031 0.028 0.027 
Supervisory control  Coefficient  -0.035 -0.063  -0.213 -0.021  0.016 -0.017 -0.079 
   S.E.  0.098 0.091  0.167  0.09 0.144 0.097 0.114 
Financial reform (overall)  Coefficient  -0.092                    
   S.E.  0.16                    
Credit controls reform  Coefficient     -0.775                 
   S.E.     0.786                 
Interest rate control reform  Coefficient        -0.985              
   S.E.        0.757              
Banking entry reform  Coefficient           -0.743           
   S.E.           1.142           
Privatization reform  Coefficient              -0.428        
   S.E.              0.768        
Capital controls reform  Coefficient                 -0.271     
   S.E.                 0.402     
Securities markets reform  Coefficient                    -0.634 
   S.E.                    0.901 
Constant  Coefficient  1.868*** 1.558**  1.894 1.572**  1.893*** 1.620**  1.655***   37 
   S.E.  0.724 0.735  1.366 0.767  0.71 0.656 0.633 
                         
No. of Observations    1164 1164  1164 1164 1164 1164 1164 
Wald Chi-squared    35.887*** 72.969***  183.900*** 63.209*** 40.660*** 40.014*** 46.675*** 
Probability (Wald Test of Exogeniety)    0.99  0.49  0.663 0.609 0.842 0.728 0.546 
Probability (Amemiya-Lee-Newey Statisitc)    0.891 0.723  0.779 0.335 0.938 0.989 0.609 
*** indicates significance at 1 percent level of significance, ** indicates significance at 5 percent level and * indicates significance at 10 percent level of significance.   
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Table A6. Effect of financial reform on systemic crises - Developing economies 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Real GDP growth (t-1)  Coefficient  -1.175*** -1.265*** -1.393*** -1.306*** -1.414*** -1.287*** -1.329*** -1.377*** 
   S.E.  0.313 0.358  0.36 0.356 0.359 0.359 0.356 0.361 
Log (Initial GDP/capita)  Coefficient  -0.046 -0.065* -0.066*  -0.074** -0.066* -0.067* -0.064* -0.064*     
   S.E.  0.036 0.037 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.036 
Real interest rate  Coefficient  0.003*** 0.003***  0.003** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
   S.E.  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Inflation  Coefficient  0.057 0.081 0.107 0.131 0.106 0.059 0.071 0.109 
   S.E.  0.165  0.172 0.17 0.17 0.17  0.172 0.17 0.17 
Depreciation  Coefficient  0.218*  0.188 0.198*  0.197 0.210* 0.205* 0.196* 0.204*     
   S.E.  0.117 0.121  0.12 0.121  0.12  0.12 0.119  0.12 
Initial level of liberalization  Coefficient  -0.025* -0.028* -0.028* -0.026* -0.026* -0.026* -0.028* -0.026*     
   S.E.  0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.014 
Supervisory control (SC)  Coefficient  -0.012 0.046 0.019 0.017  -0.013 0.009 0.018 0.002 
   S.E.  0.025 0.031 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.028 
Reform (LR) (overall)  Coefficient     -0.003                    
   S.E.     0.007                    
SC*LR  Coefficient     -0.026***                    
   S.E.     0.01                    
Credit controls reform (CR)  Coefficient        0.031                 
   S.E.        0.023                 
SC*CR  Coefficient        -0.055**                 
   S.E.        0.028                 
Interest rate control reform (IR)  Coefficient           -0.014              
   S.E.           0.018              
SC*IR  Coefficient           -0.082***              
   S.E.           0.03              
Banking entry reform (BR)  Coefficient              -0.019           
   S.E.              0.025           
SC*BR  Coefficient              0.035             39 
   S.E.              0.029           
Privatization reform (PR)  Coefficient                 -0.046        
   S.E.                 0.03        
SC*PR   Coefficient                 -0.032        
   S.E.                 0.031        
Capital controls reform (CapR)  Coefficient                    0.001     
   S.E.                    0.023     
SC*CapR  Coefficient                    -0.079***     
   S.E.                    0.03     
Securities markets reform (SR)  Coefficient                       -0.012 
   S.E.                       0.034 
SC*SR  Coefficient                       -0.013 
   S.E.                       0.04 
                             
No. of Observations     1000 944 944 944 944 944 944 944 
No. of Countries     61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Wald Chi-squared     37.252*** 51.463*** 43.737*** 52.390*** 41.651*** 49.291*** 49.829*** 41.292*** 
L Ratio Test     132.369*** 134.574*** 133.979*** 132.115*** 133.158*** 140.819*** 136.700*** 126.530*** 
Brier Score     0.181 0.177 0.179 0.177 0.179 0.179 0.177 0.179 
 Reported co-efficient and corresponding  Standard Errors (S.E.)  are Average Marginal Effects and have been calculated as suggested by Bartus (2005) 
*** indicates significance at 1 percent level of significance, ** indicates significance at 5 percent level and * indicates significance at 10 percent level of significance.    
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Figure A1. Effect of financial reform on systemic banking crises at different levels of supervisory control (non-high income OECD countries) 
 
The figure shows the marginal effect of different kinds of financial reform on the likelihood of systemic banking crises at different levels of supervisory controls for non high-income OECD 
countries. It corresponds to our results in Table A6. The middle line shows the marginal effect of a particular dimension of reform while the upper and lower lines indicate the upper and lower 95 
percent confidence intervals. LR refers to overall reform, CR refers to credit control reform, IR refers to interest rate control reform, BR refers to banking entry reform, PR refers to privatization 
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